{"id":3340,"date":"2025-07-13T00:53:21","date_gmt":"2025-07-12T23:53:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/?p=3340"},"modified":"2025-07-13T01:16:22","modified_gmt":"2025-07-13T00:16:22","slug":"the-boeing-787-dreamliner-tragedy-what-the-preliminary-report-doesnt-explain","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/?p=3340","title":{"rendered":"The Boeing 787 Dreamliner Tragedy: What the Preliminary Report Doesn\u2019t Explain"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n

Like many of you, I had been eagerly waiting for the preliminary report on the tragic Air India Boeing 787 Dreamliner crash. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), a division under India\u2019s Ministry of Civil Aviation, released the report on July 12, 2025. It provides a technical sequence of events, but it also raises some serious and uncomfortable questions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As usual, news channels quickly began sharing snippets, expert sound bites, and theories. One particular quote from the cockpit voice recorder stood out: a pilot asked, \u201cWhy did you cut off?\u201d<\/em> The other responded, \u201cI didn\u2019t.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n


Soon after, narratives began flooding in \u2014 pilot suicide, sabotage, or even hijacking. Most prominently, the story being pushed is one of pilot error<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

I couldn\u2019t accept that so easily. So, I went straight to the source \u2014 the full 15-page report available on the AAIB website. What I found shifted my perspective.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

A Timeline of Events from the Preliminary Report<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Here\u2019s what the report outlines regarding the events on June 12:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. Flight AI423, a Boeing 787-8, landed in Ahmedabad from Delhi.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. The crew reported a defect labeled \u201cSTAB POS XDCR\u201d in the technical log.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. On-duty maintenance staff inspected the issue and cleared the aircraft for the next flight.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. Both pilots had adequate rest and passed breath analyzer tests before the flight.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  5. 230 passengers and 54,200 kg of fuel were on board; the aircraft was within its takeoff weight limit.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  6. No dangerous goods were carried.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  7. The aircraft reached a speed of 180 knots after passing V1 (decision speed).<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  8. Both engine fuel switches suddenly moved from RUN to CUTOFF\u2014just one second apart.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  9. One pilot questioned the other about the cutoff; the other denied doing it.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  10. The Ram Air Turbine (RAT) deployed as backup systems engaged.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  11. N2 values for both engines dropped below minimum idle speeds.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  12. Both fuel switches were returned to RUN as the crew tried to recover control.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  13. The FADEC system began relight and thrust recovery sequences.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  14. Engine 1 started recovering; Engine 2 could not stabilize.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  15. A \u201cMAYDAY\u201d call was made.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  16. The aircraft crashed outside the airport perimeter.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
    \n\n\n\n

    Reconstructing the Cockpit Moment<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    After multiple readings, I tried to picture what may have been happening in the cockpit. If you\u2019ve followed my previous blog post about this incident, you might already feel what I did \u2014 that from point 12 onward, the crew fought to regain control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    They noticed the issue. They acted fast. They tried to restart the engines and relight the systems. They issued a distress call. All of that points to a crew trying to save lives<\/strong>, not one intent on ending them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Let\u2019s consider a critical line again: \u201cWhy did you cut off?\u201d<\/em> and \u201cI didn\u2019t.\u201d<\/em>
    This exchange has been used to float a theory of intentional sabotage or suicide. But is that the only plausible explanation?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Let\u2019s break it down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n\n\n\n

    Two Possibilities, Not One<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    There are two ways to interpret what happened:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n
    1. One pilot actually switched the fuel supply off.<\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n
    2. The switch malfunctioned or transitioned unintentionally.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      If the act was intentional, why did the pilots attempt recovery immediately? Why switch the controls back to RUN? Why send a MAYDAY?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Some might argue: perhaps only one pilot was responsible, and the other tried to fix it. That\u2019s fair. But here\u2019s where it gets more interesting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n\n\n\n

      A Known Technical Concern<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      Remember the \u201cSTAB POS XDCR\u201d error from the previous flight? That points to a faulty Stabilizer Position Transducer \u2014 a sensor that communicates trim position to the flight control system. This was logged just hours before the crash.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      That alone made me dig deeper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      I came across a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB)<\/strong> issued by the FAA in 2018. It warned that certain Boeing aircraft, including 787 models, were vulnerable to a disengaged locking feature on the fuel control switches<\/strong>. Here\u2019s what the bulletin stated:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n

      \u201cThe fuel control switches (or engine start switches) are installed on the control stand in the flight deck and used by the pilot to supply or cutoff fuel to the engines. The fuel control switch has a locking feature to prevent inadvertent operation that could result in unintended switch movement between the fuel supply and fuel cutoff positions. In order to move the switch from one position to the other under the condition where the locking feature is engaged, it is necessary for the pilot to lift the switch up while transitioning the switch position. If the locking feature is disengaged, the switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting the switch during transition, and the switch would be exposed to the potential of inadvertent operation. Inadvertent operation of the switch could result in an unintended consequence, such as an in-flight engine shutdown.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      That\u2019s a known issue. The switches on this particular aircraft, operational since 2013, had not been replaced. While other components like throttle controls had updates, the fuel switches remained original<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      I\u2019m not pointing fingers \u2014 I\u2019m connecting facts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n\n\n\n

      So, Why Just Blame the Humans?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      If this is the full picture, then why are we so focused only on pilot error?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Yes, pilot decisions matter. Yes, mental health is important. But should we completely dismiss the possibility of system failure<\/strong> \u2014 especially when prior defects and FAA warnings exist?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Why do we find it easier to doubt humans than machines?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      What if both pilots truly tried their best \u2014 and were up against an equipment malfunction that spiraled beyond control?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n\n\n\n

      The Most Baffling Part<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      The most baffling part of the report is this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n

      \u201cAt this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and\/or GE GEnx-1B engine operators and manufacturers.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      No recommendations? No advisories? No alerts?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      That seems premature. Without fully understanding how the switches moved to CUTOFF, how can we confidently say nothing needs fixing?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Why place absolute trust in the machine, and none in the human?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n\n\n\n

      Final Thoughts and A Plea for Balanced Judgment<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      My reason for writing this post isn\u2019t to defend anyone blindly. It\u2019s to call for balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Right now, we can\u2019t say with certainty if this was pilot error or a mechanical fault. Evidence suggests both are plausible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      So, let\u2019s not rush to judge the pilots \u2014 especially when they might have been the very people doing everything in their power to save lives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Machines fail. So do humans. But let\u2019s at least wait for the full story before we make up our minds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n\n\n\n

      If this perspective resonates with you, I encourage you to share it and stay informed. I\u2019ll continue following the investigation closely and offer updates as they unfold.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Source : <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Preliminary Report by AAIB : https:\/\/aaib.gov.in\/What’s%20New%20Assets\/Preliminary%20Report%20VT-ANB.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins (SAIB) – NM-18-33<\/strong> : https:\/\/drs.faa.gov\/browse\/SAIB\/doctypeDetails?modalOpened=true<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      Like many of you, I had been eagerly waiting for the preliminary report on the tragic Air India Boeing 787 Dreamliner crash. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), a division under India\u2019s Ministry of Civil Aviation, released the report on July 12, 2025. It provides a technical sequence of events, but it also raises some […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3344,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1,31],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3340","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog","category-life-personal-musings"],"blocksy_meta":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3340","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3340"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3340\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3346,"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3340\/revisions\/3346"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/3344"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3340"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3340"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/amrutharajan.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3340"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}